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Abstract
Abstract. Single parents and unmarried couples are increasingly replacing
the traditional nuclear family. This paper investigates if the greater variety in
living arrangements contributes to increased resource disparities among chil-
dren in Germany. Children in single parent families are disadvantaged in at
least three dimensions decisive for their later achievements: material standard
of living, parental education, and parental childcare time. We compute multi-
dimensional inequality and poverty indices using SOEP data from 1991-2012.
We distinguish between parental and publicly provided childcare, which is an
increasingly important in-kind benefit in Germany. We find that both mul-
tidimensional inequality and poverty declined as expanded public childcare
strongly reduces resource disparities among children.
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1 Introduction
Single parents and non-marital cohabitations are increasingly replacing the tradi-
tional nuclear family in many industrialized countries.1 The greater disparity in
family environments most likely leads to greater disparity in children’s resources,
which are major predictors of later life socio-economic success.
This paper analyses if changing family patterns in Germany create greater
disparities in children’s endowments along three dimensions: (1) parental income;
(2) parental education; (3) and care time; all crucial determinants of children’s later
outcomes. Higher parental income translates into higher expected earnings for their
children via investments in health and education, as argued by Becker and Tomes
(1979, 1986).2 Parental education reflects parental productivity in child-enhancing
activities (Black and Devereux, 2011). There is broad evidence for strong correla-
tions between parental education and income, on the one hand, with their children’s
education and income later in life, on the other hand.3 Finally, time investment af-
fects the development of children’s cognitive and social-emotional skills.4 We include
both parental childcare time and publicly provided childcare and school time. In
many industrialized countries, large welfare states play an important role in ”leveling
the playing field” for children both through financial redistribution via progressive
taxes and monetary benefits as well as the provision of public services, such as pub-
lic education, childcare, and other in-kind benefits. Verbist and Matsaganis (2014)
suggest that the redistributive impact of in-kind benefits is as large as that of mon-
etary benefits, with their relative importance in social spending seeming to increase
in European countries. Since 2005, the German welfare state heavily expanded pub-
licly provided childcare, which might have counteracted growing disparities among
1See, e.g., McLanahan (2004)
2There was a rapidly growing theoretical literature on the relation of family behavior and the
distribution of income and wealth in the 1970s and 1980s, among which Becker and Tomes (1979,
1986) are probably the best known contributions.
3The large literature on intergenerational mobility since the 1990s is summarized in Black and
Devereux (2011) and Jenkins and Ja¨ntti (2015).
4An extensive overview of empirical studies on the importance of certain early life conditions




We apply Maasoumi’s index for multidimensional inequality (Maasoumi, 1986,
1999) and poverty (Lugo and Maasoumi, 2008), where resources are first aggregated
for each individual and then aggregated across individuals to arrive at a single index.6
Maasoumi’s proposition to first aggregate dimensions for each individual carries the
benefit that low levels of one dimension can be compensated with high levels of
another dimension at the individual level. E.g., lower net incomes, lower parental
education and less parental time, which applies to the average child in a single parent
family, may be at least partly compensated by publicly provided childcare.
We contribute to the growing literature on multidimensional inequality and
poverty measurement, which promotes a shift from the sole focus on income to a
broader concept of ”well-being” by incorporating endowments along several dimen-
sions into a single measure.7 Our study is also related to the literature on equality of
opportunity, which separates the influence on outcomes into circumstances beyond
individual control and individual effort.8 If people believe that inequality is caused
by circumstances beyond individual control they are less willing to accept high in-
equality levels and support more redistribution (Fong, 2001; Corneo and Gru¨ner,
2002). Niehues and Peichl (2014) find that a sizable share of total inequality in
Germany and the US can be attributed to circumstances beyond individual control.
We argue that our three dimensions are beyond the children’s control.
Our main results are as follows. Both multidimensional inequality and poverty
among children decreased between 1991 and 2012, despite changing family patterns.
The decline is driven by expanded publicly provided childcare that reduced inequal-
ity along this dimension and more than offsets rising income inequality among chil-
dren. The finding is robust to different assumptions on inequality and poverty aver-
sion and to the degree of substitutability between dimensions. However, increasing
5According to Schober and Stahl (2014), the use of publicly provided childcare has dispropor-
tionately grown among single mothers and highly educated mothers since 2006.
6Further applications of Maasoumi’s index include, e.g., Nilsson (2010); Justino (2012); Rohde
and Guest (2013).
7Rawls (1971) and Sen (1985) first advocated a multidimensional perspective on the notion
of well-being. See Aaberge and Brandolini (2015) for a summary and thorough discussion of the
multidimensional approaches as well as the introduction of Decancq and Lugo (2013).
8The literature on equality of opportunity was pioneered by Roemer (1993, 1998).
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the weight of income and decreasing the weight of publicly provided childcare takes
away the declining trend in some cases.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe our data, sample
and the measurement of (1) parental income; (2) parental education; as well as (3)
parental and non-parental childcare time. Section 3 describes how these resources
evolved over time by family type. The methodological approach deriving multidi-
mensional inequality and poverty indices is described in Section 4. In Section 5, we
present and discuss our results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Our analysis is based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The SOEP is
an annual survey of German households that includes a variety of demographic and
socio-economic characteristics for all years since 1984. East German households are
included in the panel since 1990. By 2013, almost 11,000 households participated,
which corresponds to approximately 20,000 individuals.9
Our sample includes East and West German children. Children are defined as
individuals that are younger than 14 years and still live in the household of their
parents.10 We further differentiate between children living with married, cohabiting
and single parents. We start the analysis with the year 1991 in order to include
East German children that entered the sample after reunification in 1990. In order
to maximize the sample size and to minimize problems like panel attrition, we
use the original and all refreshment samples (A-K) of the SOEP in an unbalanced
panel design excluding the migration sample from 2013. Furthermore, our sample
is restricted to children, where values of all four attributes are observed, by which
we lose about 2,500 observations from a total of about 77,000 observations over the
entire period. In 2013, the sample includes about 3,000 observations.11
Children’s resources are measured along three dimensions: (1) parental income;
9For further details see Wagner et al. (2007) and Gerstorf and Schupp (2015).
10Sensitivity tests show that our results are robust to restricting our sample to children younger
than seven years.
11The number of observed children by family type is provided in Appendix Table A.1.
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(2) parental education; (3) and care time.
1. Parental income
Parental income is measured as real net equivalent household income. Net
household income is the sum of households’ labour earnings, asset flows, pri-
vate retirement income, private transfers, public transfers, and social security
pensions minus total household taxes including imputed rents from housing.
Income is equivalized using the modified OECD scale to take into account
different needs of adults and children in the household.
2. Parental education
Parental education is measured as years of education completed at the time of
the survey. For married and cohabiting parents, we use the value of the parent
with the highest number of years of education.
3. Childcare time
(a) Parental childcare time
In contrast to many other surveys, where parental time can only be mea-
sured as a residual term, we are able to directly observe total time de-
voted to childcare activities by each parent: Every household member
aged sixteen or older is asked the number of hours spent on childcare on
an average weekday. Parental childcare time is the sum of hourly child-
care activities of household head and spouse for all children on an average
weekday. Unfortunately, we do not observe the type of childcare such that
we cannot distinguish between physical and non-physical childcare (e.g.
nourishing vs. teaching) or direct and indirect childcare (e.g. reading
vs. doing household tasks together). Consequently, we can only measure
quantity of childcare time and not quality. Empirical evidence shows that
quality of childcare time depends on parents’ educational level.12 Higher
12E.g., Doyle et al. (2009) find that children of low-educated mothers tend to have lower achieve-
ments in tests measuring cognitive, socio-emotional and behavioural skills than children from high-
educated families.
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quality of childcare time might thus be captured by considering parental
education as a separate dimension.
Since parents’ only state the total time spend with children, we have to
adjust total time to the number of children in the household. We assume
that parents’ caring time is not proportionally increasing with the num-
ber of children and that there are economies of scale in parenting within
families. Evidence for this hypothesis is given by time use studies. In
particular, Ku¨hhirt (2012) shows that West German married and cohab-
iting parents do not spend significantly more time on childcare activities
if there is more than one child living in the same household. To construct
comparable one child equivalent families we apply a generalized version
of the square root scale13 on total parental childcare time, PT , of both







where s is the number of siblings living in a household and θ is an equiv-
alence elasticity (Bo¨nke and Schro¨der, 2012). θ = 0.5 produces the well-
known square root equivalence scale. Dividing total parental childcare
time by the number of children (this would be equal to θ = 1) would most
likely underestimate parental time devoted to each child in the presence
of economies of scale in parenting. On the other hand, assigning the total
parental time to each child in the family (this would be equal to θ = 0),
would certainly overestimate parental time per child.14
(b) Non-parental childcare time
Non-parental childcare time includes total hours spent in crib, kinder-
garten, after school care club, with a child-minder or in school on an
13We use the square root scale to consider the number of siblings only, in contrast to the modified
OECD scale used for income which also considers the number of adults in the household.
14Our results on trends in parental childcare inequality are robust to changes of θ. Inequality
levels vary in θ, but differences are not significant. Results are available from the authors upon
request.
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average weekday depending on the age of the respective child. Since the
bulk of this care time is provided by the state and presumably only a
small portion is spent with a private child-minder, we also refer to this
dimension as publicly provided childcare time.
We only observe if children spent half- or full-day in the above mentioned
institutions on an average weekday. According to information on pub-
lic childcare provision, we assign four hours for half-day care and eight
hours for full-day care. Since 2009 exact hours are asked in the SOEP
questionnaire, but for consistency reasons we stick to our half-day and
full-day categories.
Time in school is based on information from publications of the Standing
Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Ger-
man La¨nder (Kultusministerkonferenz der La¨nder), where school hours
taught per week are provided by class type, class level and federal state
(Bundesland) for the 1992-2012 period. We take 1992 values for 1991,
where no information is available. We assign school hours taught in ele-
mentary school to every child aged between six and ten in the respective
Bundesland and year. The average of actually taught school hours over
all lower secondary school types is assigned to every child aged between
eleven and thirteen in the respective Bundesland and year.15
There exist large differences within and across regions and between pri-
vate and public childcare and schools (Camehl et al., 2015). SOEP data
only includes questions on the quality of publicly provided childcare for
children in preschool age. Information on the attended school and its
respective quality is not observed. Therefore, we might underestimate
disparities in non-parental childcare time.
15We also incorporate the fact that primary school usually lasts until class level six in the federal
states of Berlin and Brandenburg, in contrast to four years in the other federal states. We take
averages over all lower secondary school types for each year because school types and hours taught
in lower secondary schools vary heavily within and between Bundesla¨nder over time. Secondary
school types in Germany are Hauptschule, Realschule, Gesamtschule, Schularten mit mehreren
Bildungsga¨ngen and Gymnasium.
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3 Trends in Family Resources in Germany
Since the mid-1960s, the traditional nuclear family consisting of a married couple
and their respective children is on retreat. An increasing number of children grows
up in comparably disadvantaged families with only one parent.16
As Figure 1 shows, the total number of children in Germany decreased from
approximately 22 million in 1991 to 19 million in 2012. Over this period, the share
of children living in traditional nuclear families decreased from 84.5 percent to 73.6
percent. At the same time, the share of children living in cohabiting couple families
more than doubled increasing from 2.9 percent to 6.5 and the share of children in
single parent families increased from 12.6 percent to 19.9 percent. In particular, the
number of female-headed single parent households has risen sharply. In contrast,
the number of children per family remained fairly constant.17
Figure 1: Trends in the number of children by family type
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2013, Table 6.5), own calculations.
Note: Values for the years 1991-1995 are not available and thus imputed using a linear trend.
Figure 2 depicts the average trends in Germany in each dimension by family
16A wide sociological and demographical literature examines the general trends and causes of the
so-called second demographic transition for Western countries, e.g., Peuckert (2012), Lesthaeghe
(2010), and McLanahan and Percheski (2008).
17The share of families with one child increased from 31.4 percent in 1991 to 33.4 percent in
2012, whereas the share of families with two (three or more) children declined from 46.2 (22.4)
percent to 45 (21.6) percent.
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type from 1991 to 2012. Graph 2a shows that children’s average equivalent net in-
come increased from 17,832 Euro to 21,223 Euro (+19 percent). Children living in
traditional married couple families experienced both a higher level and a higher in-
come growth rate than their counterparts in single parent families.18 Consequently,
the absolute income gap between children from married and cohabiting couple fam-
ilies on the one hand and children from single parent families on the other hand has
widened.
Similarly, married and cohabiting couples exhibit, on average, more years of
education than single parents, as can be taken from Graph 2b. However, although
years of education increased for all family types, the education gap did not.
Parental childcare time depicted in Graph 2c replicates the pattern observed
for parental income and education. Children in single parent families receive less care
time from their parents. Of course, this gap is mostly explained by the total number
of parents present in the family.19 Equivalizing childcare time reduces the level of
childcare time per child across all family types, as depicted in Graph 2d, but more
so for children living in traditional married couple families due to the larger number
of children living in this type of family. Average (equivalent) parental childcare time
increased slightly from 8.0 (5.8) hours in 1991 to 8.6 (6.3) hours in 2012.20
Finally, Figure 2e shows that, in contrast to the other dimensions, the average
child in a single parent family receives more non-parental childcare time than an av-
erage child living with married or cohabiting couple families. Average non-parental
childcare time increased from 3.6 to 5 hours per day. A number of legislative changes
expanded public childcare provision in Germany, particularly since 2005.21 In some
municipalities, special consideration is given to single parents. The observed trend
18Single parent families lack a second potential earner. Moreover, most single parents are females
who have lower hourly wages and lower working hours than males.
19Single parents spend less time on childcare since they are not able to share housework with a
partner and cannot reduce their working time being the only ”breadwinner.”
20See Section 2 for care time equivalization.
21A new law in 2004 introduced a legal claim for children under three years of age for a place in a
day care center if certain conditions are met. Another law in 2008 redefined this claim for children
older than one. Consequently, the share of children under three in day care centers increased from
8 to 24 percent in West Germany between 1991 and 2013, while remaining at roughly 50 percent
in East Germany where the use of publicly provided childcare has a stronger tradition (Schober
and Stahl, 2014).
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indicates that expanded public supply may at least partly offset single parent chil-
dren’s disadvantage in parental care time.
Figure 2: Average trends by dimension
(a) Average equivalent net income (b) Average years of parental education
(c) Average parental childcare time (d) Average parental childcare time
(e) Average non-parental childcare time
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Incomes are in prices of 2010 and equivalized using the modified OECD scale. Education is measured as
years of highest educated parent. Parental childcare time is the sum of household head’s and spouse’s stated
childcare time on an average week day. Non-parental time is categorically coded (0,4, or 8). Significance at the five
percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications. Higher volatility of the series for
children in cohabiting couples is due to small sample sizes and relatively large variation of the respective sample
size over time (see A.1).
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4 Method
In this section, we explain and discuss how we measure inequality and poverty in a
multidimensional setting.
First, we have to normalize the observed values xitd for every child i, i =
1, ..., N , and dimension d, d = 1, ..., D, because of the dimensions’ different measure-
ment units, which are daily hours for childcare and schooltime, Euro for income and
years for education. We transform observed values xitd to values between zero and
one for all observation years t, where the dimension-specific maximum and minimum
over all years t serve as so-called goalposts (see, e.g., United Nations Development
Programme, 2014).22 Transformed values x˜itd are obtained by the following formula:
x˜itd =
xitd −minxd
maxxd −minxd . (2)
After normalization, we replace all zero observations with 0.001, since GE
measures of inequality are not defined for zero values.23
Most importantly, an aggregation rule that transforms the dimensions’ dis-
tributions into a single real value has to be decided upon.24 One approach is to
first aggregate across children for each single dimension and second aggregate the
dimension-specific indicators. This approach is easily applicable if only aggregates
are available by dimension and, thus, forms the basis for the UN’s Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI). If individual data are available for each dimension, the joint
distribution can be taken into account and potentially compensating effects between
dimensions can be considered for each child. Then, as suggested by Maasoumi (1986,
1999), dimensions are first aggregated for each individual using a utility-like function
22The goalpost approach is a linear transformation that is used, for instance, to construct the
Human Development Index. Of course, the transformation affects the inequality measured in
each dimension, but, so far, standardization offers the best solution how to overcome different
measurement units. See Decancq and Lugo (2013) for details on standardization procedures.
23Sensitivity tests show that our results are robust to choosing values closer to zero. Results are
available from the authors upon request.
24The problem of choosing an appropriate well-being index including the selection of dimensions,
substitution rates between each pair of dimensions, dimension weights etc., is also known as Rawl’s
index problem (Rawls, 1971, p. 80).
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and then a univariate inequality measure is employed to aggregate the utility-like
values across individuals. Maasoumi’s index is an ”ad-hoc” measure as compared
to an axiomatic approach. The ”ad-hoc” chosen parameter values make value judg-
ments, e.g., the degree of substitutability between the dimensions and the weight of
each dimension, explicit and transparent.25
In the first step, every child’s observed endowments x˜id – suppressing time
index t – are aggregated using aggregation function Si, which can be interpreted as
some utility-like function used to rank alternative distributions according to their
social desirability (see Weymark, 2006). In our context, it measures a child’s oppor-
tunities incorporating disposable income, parents’ educational background and care
time into a single measure. According to Maasoumi (1986) the optimal aggregation
function Si minimizes the distance between the joint distribution of the resources
and the distribution of the index under the condition
N∑
i=1














, β = 0. (4)
In the second step, the utility-like function Si to which we will refer to as oppor-
tunity indicator is aggregated to arrive at a measure of multidimensional inequality
(Section 4.1) and of multidimensional poverty (Section 4.3).
4.1 Multidimensional Inequality
Maasoumi (1986, 1999) proposes a measure from the General Entropy (GE) family
for the inequality of the distribution of S = (S1, ..., SN). We can derive the following
GE specifications to get a measure of multidimensional inequality Iα, where S¯ =
25Maasoumi’s index satisfies the desirable properties for measuring multidimensional inequal-
ity: monotonicity, continuity, normalization, anonymity, homotheticity, subgroup decomposability,
weak uniform majorization as well as individualism. See, e.g., Tsui (1999), Lugo (2007) or Weymark
(2006) for a comprehensive discussion on desirable distributional and non-distributional properties




Si/N is the average of the aggregated well-being indicator for N children:
GE inequality measure Iα



















































The magnitude of multidimensional inequality measured crucially depends on
the chosen weighting structure w (1), the substitutability between dimensions β
(2), and the inequality aversion parameter α (3). We elaborate on the weighting
structure in Section 4.4.
The parameter β determines the degree of substitution between all pairs of
dimensions. If β = 1, then all dimensions are perfect substitutes, i.e., low levels
of one dimension can be perfectly compensated by high levels of another. The
smaller β, the smaller is the substitutability between the dimensions, i.e., the loss
of one unit in one dimension can only be compensated by ever more extra units in
another dimension to keep the level of well-being constant. If β converges to minus
infinity, then dimensions are treated as perfect complements and the opportunity
indicator depends on the dimension where the child is worst off regardless of the
chosen weighting structure.
The parameter α determines the degree of concavity of the inequality measure
and indicates to what extent a society values the well-being of some individuals
in the distribution different from others. The lower α, the more weight is put on
individuals at the bottom of the distribution and, thus, the more sensitive is the
inequality measure to changes in the lower part of the distribution. The Mean
Logarithmic Deviation (MLD), where α = 0, is thus more sensitive to changes at
the bottom than the Theil, where α = 1, or the Half Squared Coefficient of Variation
(HSCV), where α = 2.
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4.2 Decomposition of Multidimensional Inequality
To further investigate the relationship between changing family patterns and our
measure for children’s opportunity, we decompose the intertemporal change in mul-
tidimensional inequality by family type. Using inequality measures from the GE
family in the second step of our multidimensional framework, we can additively
decompose the changes in multidimensional inequality into a within group and a
between group component (see Shorrocks, 1980; Maasoumi, 1986). In particular,
we can decompose the MLD denoted as I0, which is the only path independent

















F is the number of family types, vf = nf/n is the population share of family
type f , I0f is the family type specific level of multidimensional inequality measured
by MLD, and λf = S¯f/S¯ reflects family type f ’s average opportunities relative to
the overall opportunity average. Since we are particularly interested in the impact
of changing family patterns on the change in multidimensional inequality over time,
we decompose the inequality change ∆I = It+1 − It, suppressing the GE index α,


















f=1 vf,t ln(λf,t+1), rearranging













vf,t∆ ln(λf ). (11)
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v¯f∆ ln(λf ). (12)
The first term gives the impact of the change in within family type inequality
∆If on the overall inequality change. However, the change in relative importance
of family types ∆vf affects not only the two middle terms but also the last term
through λf = S¯f/S¯ because of S¯ =
∑F
f=1 vf S¯f . Since we want to exactly identify
the effect of ∆vf on the overall inequality change, we rearrange the last term in
Equation (12) and then approximate the decomposition according to Mookherjee





























where θf = vf S¯f/S¯ is the family type’s share of total population’s well-being.
We can now clearly distinguish between the impact of changes in (1) within family
inequality and (4) between family inequality, as well as the impact of changing
relative importance of family types on the (2) within and (3) between family type
inequality.
4.3 Multidimensional Poverty
In the view of policy implications, we might be particularly interested in the lower
part of the distribution. Therefore, we also compute measures of multidimensional
poverty. To stay as close as possible to our methodological framework for inequality
presented above, we focus on a multidimensional poverty measure based on infor-
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mation theory introduced by Lugo and Maasoumi (2008).26
As for multidimensional inequality, we start with each child’s utility-like func-
tion Si (see equations (3) and (4)) covering the endowments in all dimensions. But
to identify the children with poor opportunities we must decide on a poverty line.
One can either use dimension-specific poverty thresholds before aggregation
(component poverty line approach) or an aggregate poverty line derived from dimension-
specific poverty lines (aggregate poverty line approach (APL)). Since we aggregate di-
mensions in the first step, we construct an APL, which we denote Sz, from dimension-
specific poverty lines zd. The dimension-specific poverty lines zd are defined as 60
percent of the median value in each dimension. E.g., children are identified as in-
come poor if they have 60 percent of the median real equivalent net income or less.













zwdd , β = 0. (15)
Children with an opportunity indicator Si below the aggregate poverty line Sz
are identified as poor in opportunities.27
Then, we aggregate the level of well-being of children identified as poor with
the following function
26See, e.g., Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) or Alkire and Foster (2011) for a detailed
discussion of counting and multidimensional poverty measures including differences in identifying
the poor (union, intersection or dual cutoff methods).
27According to the union approach, an individual is already identified as multidimensional poor
if she is deprived at least in one dimension. The intersection approach identifies an individual as
multidimensional poor if it is deprived in all dimensions at the same time (see, e.g., Alkire and
Foster, 2011). In contrast, we apply an intermediate approach that allows for some substitution
between dimensions such that disadvantages in one or more dimensions can be compensated by
advantages in other dimensions in which an individual is not deprived (Lugo and Maasoumi, 2008).
However, the poverty function collapses to the union approach if β is infinitely small such that
only the worst dimension is considered in Si.
15


















where pi is the multi-attribute poverty function for each child i. Our poverty
measure is directly related to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures
and satisfies the same distributional and non-distributional properties. A general
formulation that allows for some substitution between dimensions above and below

















, β 6= 0. (17)
The magnitude of poverty measured crucially depends on the choice of the
parameters w, β and φ. Note that a higher φ in FGT poverty measures indicates
higher poverty aversion putting more weight on the children identified as poor.
4.4 Weights
The weighting structure w determines the trade-off between any pair of dimensions
and reflects value judgments on which factors are viewed as more important than
others for children’s later achievements. We apply three methods to check the
robustness of our findings to the chosen weights.28
First, we assign equal weights to all dimensions following an agnostic approach.
Equal weighting is widely used in empirical works on multidimensional inequality
and poverty, e.g., in the Human Development Index.
Second, we employ a data-driven approach and calculate frequency-based weights
following Cheli and Lemmi (1995). The weights wd are defined as
28Deutsch and Silber (2005) describe various methods to set weights in a multidimensional
framework. Decancq and Lugo (2013) comprehensively discuss the issue of weight setting in a
multidimensional framework and compare the advantages and disadvantages of three existing ap-
proaches: (1) data-driven; (2) normative; and (3) hybrid. Overall, there is no unifying theoretical
framework that argues in favor of one specific weighting scheme. Both studies rather conclude
to rely on reasonable trade-offs between dimensions and to perform a series of robustness checks













where Pd is the dimension-specific headcount ratio. Accordingly, the weights
wd are an inverse function of the average degree of deprivation; the lower the share
of deprived children in one dimension, the greater the weight of the respective di-
mension.
Third, we gradually increase the weight of income from 1/4 to 9/10 and pro-
portionally reduce the weight of the other dimensions checking if level and trends in
multidimensional inequality and poverty change.
5 Results
We first present results how inequality of each dimension evolved between 1991 and
2012. Then we present and discuss the results from our multidimensional analysis.
5.1 Univariate Inequality and Poverty
Univariate inequality in each dimension measured by the MLD is given in Figure
3. Income and parental time inequality significantly increased between 1991 and
2012 (Figures 3a and 3c).29 In contrast, inequality of parental education did not
change significantly (Figure 3b), while publicly provided childcare time decreased
significantly (Figure 3d). However, differences in inequality levels across dimensions
depend on the inequality measure: Inequality of non-parental time is by far the
highest when measured by the MLD.30 Non-parental time inequality decreases in
the 2000s when several policy initiatives were enforced to increase the provision of
29Prior research shows that changing family structures have actually led to an increase in family
income inequality. E.g., Danziger and Gottschalk (1993) find that 13 percent of the increase in
U.S. family income inequality among the white population between 1969 and 1987 was due to
changing family structures, the rise in female-headed single parent families in particular. Peichl
et al. (2012) show that decreasing average household size in Germany between 1991 and 2007 is
associated with increasing income inequality.
30Appendix Figure A.1 shows that inequality of non-parental time is similarly unequal as parental
time when measured by the Gini. The share of children receiving zero non-parental childcare time
declined from more than 30 percent in 1991 to less than 15 percent in 2012 which is more reflected
by the MLD than by the Gini.
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public childcare in Germany, especially for children under the age of three.
Figure 3: Inequality by dimension
(a) Parental income (b) Parental education
(c) Parental time (d) Non-parental time
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Parental time is equivalized according to the number of children in the family. Significance at the five
percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
The headcount ratio presented in Figure 4 shows the share of children by family
type counted as poor in one dimension, i.e. their resource level is lower than 60
percent of the median. As we see for average numbers in Section 3, children living in
single parent households are disadvantaged in parental income (Figure 4a), parental
education (Figure 4b), and parental time (4c), but are better off with respect to non-
parental childcare time (Figure 4d). About 40 percent of single parents’ children is
considered as income poor, contrasting to an overall income poverty risk between
7 and 14 percent in 1991 and 2012. The overall share of children with publicly
provided time lower than 60 percent of the median sharply decreased over time.
Interestingly, children living with cohabiting couples seem the least likely to spend
much time in publicly provided childcare.
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Figure 4: Poverty risk by dimension
(a) Parental income (b) Parental education
(c) Parental time (d) Non-parental time
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Parental time is equivalized according to the number of children in the family. Significance at the five
percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
5.2 Multidimensional Inequality
Our results in Section 3 and 5.1 suggest that children living in single parent families
are disadvantaged in parental income, parental education and parental time, but
single parents make more use of publicly provided childcare time. The analysis
of multidimensional inequality allows us to draw conclusions if disadvantages in
one dimension are compensated by advantages in another at the individual level.
Growing univariate inequality might be less of a concern if these dimensions indeed
compensate each other and multidimensional inequality does not icrease. In our
baseline scenario, we consider parental care time and publicly provided care time
as separate dimensions since it can hardly be argued that they should be added up
and, hence, treated as perfect substitutes.31
31Instead, it seems to depend on the perceived quality of parental childcare time, whether one
type of care should be preferred over the other.
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All in all, multidimensional inequality significantly declines between 1991 and
2012, which is largely driven by the expansion of publicly provided childcare. In
the following, we vary each of the ”ad-hoc” chosen parameters of the Maasoumi
index and check the robustness of the declining trend in the view of reasonable
parameter values. Figure 5 shows that the decline is robust to degrees of inequality
aversion between 0 and 2, which is the interval empirically agreed on.32 This applies
to assuming dimensions to be complements (left-hand graph) or perfect substitutes
(right-hand graph).
Figure 5: Multidimensional inequality with varying degrees of inequality aversion
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
The declining trend persists for different degrees of substitutability between our
four dimensions as shown by the left-hand graph in Figure 6. Even if we assume that
all dimensions are perfectly substitutable, the declining trend remains but is smaller
in size. However, the assumption of perfect substitutability seems rather far-fetched:
One unit less parental time is most likely not perfectly compensated by one unit
more income.33 In contrast, one could argue that among our dimensions parental
time and non-parental time are closest to being perfect substitutes. The right-hand
graph of Figure 6 shows multidimensional inequality if we collapse both childcare
time measure into one dimension and, consequently, end up with three dimensions in
total. The declining trend is robust to different degrees of substitutability between
32See Aaberge and Brandolini (2015) or Lambert et al. (2003) for an overview on studies that
either estimate α, e.g., through the elasticity of marginal social utility of income, or use parameter
ranges that seem theoretically plausible. Values vary between zero and three.
33For β < 1, the utility-like function is a concave function and reflects a preference for a more
equal vector of (transformed) achievements (Decancq and Lugo, 2013).
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the three dimensions, but changes are no longer significant for all years. With equal
weighting, income now receives a weight of 1/3 and non-parental childcare a weight
of 1/6 such that the equalizing effect of non-parental time is deemphasized.
Figure 6: Multidimensional inequality with varying degrees of substitution
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
As a robustness check, we also computed multidimensional inequality using
frequency-based weights. We broadly find the same trends and significance levels as
for equal weighting.34
So far we find that multidimensional inequality has decreased since the begin-
ning of the 1990s and that this result is quite robust against different parameter
settings. But how sensitive is the multidimensional inequality index to increasing
the income weight, where univariate inequality increased over the past two decades.
Figure 7 shows how our multidimensional index of inequality changes, if we grad-
ually increase the weight of income towards unity under the restriction that the
remaining three dimensions are equally weighted and that all dimensions sum up
to one. Assuming a low degree of substitutability (β = −1) in the left-hand graph,
we still find a decline in multidimensional inequality even when weighting income
by 90 percent. Assuming a slightly higher degree of substitutability (β = 0) in the
right-hand graph the trend reverses when weighting income by 90 percent.
Finally, we check if our results are indeed driven by the expansion of publicly
provided childcare. Figure 3 shows that non-parental childcare time became more
equally distributed over the time period under study. In fact, the declining trend
34Figures A.2 are in Appendix.
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Figure 7: Multidimensional inequality with varying income weights
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
disappears once we exclude publicly provided childcare and consider only the three
other dimensions as shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Multidimensional inequality excluding non-parental childcare time
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
5.3 Decomposition of Multidimensional Inequality by Fam-
ily Type
We now turn to the impact of increasing non-traditional families on children’s mul-
tidimensional inequality between 1991 and 2012. Table 1 depicts to what extent
the total change in multidimensional inequality given in the second column can be
attributed to changes in the four components: changing inequality (1) within fam-
ily types; (4) changing inequality between family types; and the effect of changing
family patterns on (2) within and (3) between family type inequality. The observed
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decrease in multidimensional inequality tends to be higher for low degrees of sub-
stitutability. Reduced inequality within family types, (1), is the main explanatory
component. In contrast, inequality changes between family types, (4), as well as
family type’s share on within, (2), and between, (3), family type inequality only
negligibly contribute to the decline in multidimensional inequality and signs are not
robust to different time period specifications.
Table 1: Multidimensional inequality (MLD) decomposition by family type, 1991-
2012
Absolute % Change in I0 due to
Family Structure
β
Total Within I0 Between I0 Within I0 Between I0
(∆I0 in %) (1) (4) (2) (3)
(−10) -33.26 -33.55 0.12 0.08 0.09
(−1) -33.84 -34.15 0.03 0.26 0.01
0 -31.89 -32.49 0.03 0.78 -0.21
0.5 -29.39 -29.30 -0.09 0.64 -0.64
1 -27.17 -25.83 -0.06 -0.41 -0.87
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Differences between ∆I0 in % and the sum of components are due to rounding (after computation).
5.4 Multidimensional Poverty
The decline of multidimensional inequality may be due to losses of the better-off
children or due to gains of children at the bottom of the opportunity indicator dis-
tribution. One might argue that a combination of multiple deprivations in attributes
necessary for success later in life reduces children’s opportunities even more than
just the sum of each. To uncover the changes for those in the bottom of the multidi-
mensional distribution, we now turn to the trends of multidimensional poverty. We
also find a decline in multidimensional poverty, which is similarly robust to different
parameter values and dimension specifications.
Figure 9 shows multidimensional poverty trends for three different poverty
measures, which are headcount ratio (φ = 0), poverty gap (φ = 1), and poverty
intensity (φ = 2). All poverty measures exhibit a significant decline between 1991
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and 2012.
Figure 9: Multidimensional poverty measures
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
As Figure 10 depicts, differentiating between family types reveals a higher
multidimensional poverty risk for children from single parent families compared to
children from married and cohabiting families. Nevertheless, for both low and high
degrees of substitutability we find a considerable decline in multidimensional poverty
across all family types and the gap between them has become smaller over time.
Figure 10: Multidimensional poverty by family type
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
The poverty decline is robust to different assumptions on the substitutability
between dimensions as can be taken from the left-hand graph of Figure 11. The
level of multidimensional poverty increases in the assumed degree of substitution
between dimensions. If we assume perfect substitutability (β = 1), our measure
for children’s opportunities is a simple arithmetic mean of all dimensions. One unit
less income can be perfectly offset by more parental time. However, this assumption
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does not appear very realistic. The more complementary the dimensions, the heavier
is the effect of the worst dimension on the individual opportunity indicator and the
higher is the number of deprived children. The declining trend mostly disappears if
we sum up parental and non-parental childcare time to one dimension as shown in
the right-hand graph of Figure 11. Again, this occurs because of the new weighting
structure: when time is collapsed into one dimension, the weight of each dimension
is halved in comparison to education and income. In contrast, multidimensional
inequality still slightly declined for this setting, but not significantly anymore.
Figure 11: Multidimensional poverty with varying degrees of substitution
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
Figure 12 shows how our multidimensional poverty index changes, if we grad-
ually increase the income weight towards unity under the restriction that the re-
maining three dimensions are equally weighted and that all dimensions sum up to
one. It depends on the assumption on the degree of substitutability, if more or
less children are deprived in the multidimensional case than in the univariate case
with income only. For β = 1, e.g., low income is perfectly compensated by higher
levels in childcare time or parental education and less children are counted as mul-
tidimensionally poor than in the univariate case. For β = −1, low levels in one
dimensions are not outweighed by higher levels in the other dimensions and, hence,
more children are counted as poor than for income only. If we judge the assumption
of less than perfect substitutability as more realistic, then more children face difficult
circumstances than if we would only focus on incomes. In 2012, 30 percent of all
children experienced multidimensional poverty risk (β = −1), whereas the share of
children living under income poverty risk was 14 percent. In comparison to income
25
only, many children are additionally counted as poor in the multidimensional setting
because of low levels of non-parental childcare time, but also low levels of parental
childcare time.
Figure 12: Multidimensional poverty for varying income weights
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
As a robustness check, we compute multidimensional poverty risk using frequency-
based weights. As for multidimensional inequality, we broadly find the same trends
and similar levels. Multidimensional poverty risk rates based on frequency-based
weights tend to be slightly lower for all rates of substitution.35
Finally, Figure 13 checks if multidimensional poverty risk is driven by the
expansion of non-parental childcare time. As for multidimensional inequality, ex-
cluding non-parental childcare takes away the declining trend.
Figure 13: Multidimensional poverty excluding non-parental time
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
35Figures A.3 are in the Appendix.
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6 Conclusion
An increasing number of children in Germany are growing up in non-traditional
families, particularly in single parent families. These children are often disadvan-
taged along three dimensions: parental income, parental educational and parental
childcare time. Disadvantages may be partly compensated by publicly provided
childcare and education. Since the mid-2000s, the German welfare state has heavily
expanded publicly provided childcare.
Based on broad empirical evidence, we take parental income, parental edu-
cation and childcare time as proxies for circumstances that are beyond children’s
control, but strongly contribute to their later achievements. We apply Maasoumi’s
index for multidimensional inequality and poverty to measure how the disparity of
children’s opportunities has evolved since the beginning of the 1990s.
Focusing on income only we find that both inequality and poverty among
children increased. However, adding parental education and care time to the picture
we find that both multidimensional inequality and poverty among children decreased
over time. The expansion of childcare provided by the welfare state more than
offsets the disequalizing trends observed for income only. This finding is robust
against different parameter values for inequality and poverty aversion as well as
the degree of substitutability between dimensions. However, increasing the weight
of income and decreasing the weight of publicly provided childcare takes away the
declining trend in some constellations. An inequality decomposition by family type
reveals that the observed decline in multidimensional inequality is mainly due to
reduced differences within family types. In contrast, the effect of changing family
patterns on the inequality decline seems negligible. The share of multidimensional
poor children decreased for all family types and the gap between them has become
smaller over time. More children are counted as poor in the multidimensional setting
than if considering income only, because of low levels of non-parental and parental
childcare time devoted to them.
In sum, our analysis highlights the importance to consider more than one
dimension in inequality and poverty analysis when conclusions about developments
over time shall be drawn. Particularly, in-kind benefits such as publicly provided
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childcare and education should be accounted for to get a more complete picture
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Number of observed children (aged 0-14) by family type (un-
weighted)
Year Single Parent Cohabiting Parents Married Parents Total
1991 208 99 2,723 3,030
1992 198 110 2,586 2,894
1993 197 123 2,645 2,965
1994 219 133 2,657 3,009
1995 209 122 2,526 2,857
1996 234 137 2,408 2,779
1997 245 173 2,522 2,940
1998 269 200 2,420 2,889
1999 479 278 4,230 4,987
2000 393 307 3,650 4,350
2001 371 310 3,754 4,435
2002 361 312 3,406 4,079
2003 348 320 3,107 3,775
2004 375 307 2,853 3,535
2005 440 317 2,978 3,735
2006 399 315 2,739 3,453
2007 376 294 2,447 3,117
2008 429 331 2,583 3,343
2009 381 281 2,236 2,898
2010 432 296 2,426 3,154
2011 449 354 2,373 3,176
2012 373 325 2,111 2,809
Total 7,385 5,444 61,380 74,209
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.1: Inequality by dimension (Gini coefficient)
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Parental time is equivalized according to the number of children in the family. Significance at the five percent
level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
Figure A.2: Multidimensional inequality (with frequency-based weights)
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
Frequency-based weights, 4 dimensions: winc = .2835, weduc = .3492, wtime = .1699, and wnp−time = .1974.
Frequency-based weights, 3 dimensions: winc = .3091, weduc = .3819, and wtotal−time = .3090.
Figure A.3: Multidimensional poverty (with frequency-based weights)
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
Note: Significance at the five percent level is calculated using bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications.
Frequency-based weights, 4 dimensions: winc = .2835, weduc = .3492, wtime = .1699, and wnp−time = .1974.
Frequency-based weights, 3 dimensions: winc = .3091, weduc = .3819, and wtotal−time = .3090.
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, and wnp−time = 14)
α = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.775 0.730 0.820 0.205 0.193 0.217 0.062 0.058 0.066
1992 0.759 0.712 0.806 0.197 0.184 0.209 0.061 0.056 0.066
1993 0.755 0.710 0.800 0.200 0.185 0.214 0.063 0.058 0.069
1994 0.732 0.685 0.778 0.194 0.182 0.206 0.063 0.058 0.068
1995 0.716 0.673 0.760 0.190 0.177 0.202 0.059 0.054 0.065
1996 0.684 0.640 0.728 0.176 0.163 0.189 0.054 0.049 0.060
1997 0.739 0.693 0.786 0.186 0.177 0.196 0.054 0.051 0.057
1998 0.759 0.714 0.804 0.196 0.184 0.208 0.057 0.053 0.062
1999 0.698 0.666 0.731 0.178 0.169 0.188 0.055 0.052 0.059
2000 0.716 0.680 0.752 0.180 0.171 0.190 0.053 0.050 0.056
2001 0.671 0.632 0.711 0.177 0.166 0.187 0.053 0.049 0.057
2002 0.733 0.689 0.777 0.189 0.178 0.199 0.052 0.049 0.055
2003 0.650 0.609 0.692 0.172 0.161 0.183 0.051 0.047 0.055
2004 0.663 0.618 0.708 0.171 0.158 0.185 0.052 0.048 0.056
2005 0.627 0.582 0.671 0.166 0.154 0.179 0.052 0.048 0.057
2006 0.534 0.493 0.576 0.143 0.131 0.155 0.050 0.046 0.055
2007 0.560 0.511 0.609 0.156 0.142 0.169 0.053 0.048 0.058
2008 0.629 0.570 0.689 0.171 0.154 0.189 0.055 0.049 0.060
2009 0.546 0.490 0.601 0.155 0.139 0.170 0.056 0.050 0.061
2010 0.511 0.467 0.555 0.143 0.131 0.155 0.052 0.048 0.056
2011 0.498 0.456 0.539 0.146 0.134 0.159 0.055 0.050 0.060
2012 0.515 0.463 0.566 0.141 0.127 0.155 0.047 0.043 0.050
α = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.383 0.355 0.411 0.160 0.150 0.170 0.058 0.055 0.061
1992 0.371 0.344 0.399 0.153 0.143 0.163 0.056 0.052 0.060
1993 0.372 0.346 0.398 0.156 0.145 0.167 0.059 0.054 0.063
1994 0.361 0.334 0.388 0.152 0.142 0.162 0.059 0.055 0.063
1995 0.346 0.322 0.370 0.149 0.140 0.158 0.056 0.052 0.061
1996 0.329 0.305 0.352 0.139 0.129 0.149 0.052 0.048 0.057
1997 0.367 0.340 0.395 0.150 0.141 0.159 0.052 0.049 0.055
1998 0.373 0.347 0.400 0.155 0.145 0.164 0.054 0.050 0.057
1999 0.343 0.325 0.361 0.141 0.134 0.148 0.052 0.050 0.055
2000 0.345 0.325 0.365 0.142 0.135 0.150 0.050 0.048 0.053
2001 0.319 0.299 0.340 0.138 0.130 0.146 0.050 0.047 0.053
2002 0.350 0.325 0.374 0.148 0.140 0.157 0.049 0.047 0.052
2003 0.306 0.284 0.327 0.134 0.125 0.142 0.048 0.045 0.052
2004 0.312 0.288 0.335 0.134 0.124 0.144 0.049 0.045 0.052
2005 0.295 0.273 0.317 0.129 0.120 0.138 0.049 0.046 0.053
2006 0.247 0.227 0.267 0.111 0.103 0.120 0.047 0.044 0.051
2007 0.263 0.239 0.286 0.119 0.110 0.128 0.049 0.045 0.053
2008 0.291 0.262 0.321 0.132 0.119 0.144 0.051 0.047 0.055
2009 0.250 0.224 0.277 0.117 0.106 0.128 0.052 0.047 0.056
2010 0.235 0.215 0.255 0.110 0.101 0.118 0.049 0.046 0.052
2011 0.230 0.211 0.249 0.110 0.101 0.118 0.051 0.047 0.054
2012 0.240 0.215 0.264 0.109 0.098 0.119 0.044 0.041 0.048
α = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.303 0.277 0.330 0.145 0.135 0.155 0.058 0.055 0.061
1992 0.290 0.265 0.316 0.138 0.129 0.148 0.056 0.053 0.059
1993 0.296 0.271 0.320 0.142 0.131 0.153 0.059 0.055 0.062
1994 0.287 0.261 0.312 0.138 0.128 0.148 0.059 0.056 0.063
1995 0.273 0.251 0.294 0.136 0.126 0.145 0.057 0.052 0.062
1996 0.256 0.235 0.278 0.127 0.117 0.137 0.053 0.048 0.058
1997 0.295 0.269 0.321 0.138 0.128 0.148 0.053 0.050 0.056
1998 0.301 0.274 0.328 0.141 0.132 0.151 0.053 0.050 0.057
1999 0.275 0.258 0.291 0.129 0.122 0.136 0.052 0.050 0.054
2000 0.271 0.252 0.289 0.129 0.122 0.136 0.050 0.048 0.052
2001 0.247 0.230 0.265 0.123 0.116 0.131 0.050 0.047 0.053
2002 0.274 0.252 0.296 0.135 0.126 0.144 0.050 0.047 0.052
2003 0.236 0.217 0.254 0.120 0.112 0.128 0.049 0.045 0.052
2004 0.240 0.219 0.261 0.120 0.111 0.130 0.049 0.045 0.052
2005 0.229 0.209 0.248 0.116 0.108 0.124 0.049 0.046 0.052
2006 0.189 0.172 0.205 0.099 0.092 0.107 0.048 0.044 0.051
2007 0.205 0.185 0.225 0.106 0.098 0.115 0.049 0.045 0.052
2008 0.224 0.199 0.249 0.117 0.106 0.129 0.050 0.046 0.054
2009 0.188 0.167 0.209 0.102 0.092 0.112 0.051 0.047 0.055
2010 0.178 0.162 0.194 0.097 0.089 0.104 0.048 0.045 0.051
2011 0.175 0.160 0.190 0.096 0.088 0.103 0.050 0.046 0.053
2012 0.183 0.163 0.203 0.096 0.087 0.106 0.044 0.041 0.047
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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, and wnp−time = 16)
α = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.585 0.552 0.618 0.126 0.117 0.135 0.055 0.052 0.059
1992 0.573 0.539 0.607 0.121 0.113 0.129 0.055 0.050 0.059
1993 0.574 0.540 0.608 0.125 0.115 0.134 0.056 0.052 0.061
1994 0.556 0.523 0.590 0.126 0.118 0.134 0.058 0.054 0.062
1995 0.547 0.515 0.579 0.124 0.115 0.133 0.055 0.050 0.060
1996 0.521 0.489 0.552 0.113 0.103 0.122 0.050 0.046 0.055
1997 0.562 0.527 0.596 0.119 0.112 0.127 0.051 0.048 0.054
1998 0.576 0.543 0.610 0.123 0.115 0.132 0.053 0.049 0.057
1999 0.533 0.508 0.557 0.115 0.109 0.121 0.052 0.049 0.055
2000 0.548 0.521 0.575 0.115 0.109 0.122 0.050 0.048 0.053
2001 0.517 0.488 0.545 0.117 0.110 0.123 0.051 0.048 0.054
2002 0.567 0.535 0.600 0.128 0.120 0.136 0.050 0.048 0.053
2003 0.506 0.476 0.536 0.117 0.109 0.125 0.049 0.045 0.052
2004 0.513 0.479 0.547 0.114 0.105 0.123 0.049 0.046 0.053
2005 0.490 0.457 0.523 0.116 0.108 0.125 0.051 0.047 0.055
2006 0.422 0.390 0.454 0.101 0.093 0.109 0.049 0.045 0.052
2007 0.443 0.406 0.480 0.111 0.102 0.120 0.051 0.047 0.056
2008 0.492 0.448 0.536 0.117 0.105 0.129 0.052 0.047 0.057
2009 0.429 0.388 0.471 0.108 0.098 0.118 0.053 0.048 0.058
2010 0.404 0.371 0.437 0.104 0.096 0.111 0.050 0.047 0.054
2011 0.397 0.366 0.428 0.107 0.099 0.116 0.054 0.049 0.058
2012 0.406 0.367 0.444 0.099 0.091 0.107 0.045 0.042 0.049
α = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.340 0.316 0.363 0.108 0.101 0.116 0.052 0.049 0.055
1992 0.330 0.306 0.353 0.104 0.098 0.111 0.052 0.048 0.055
1993 0.332 0.309 0.356 0.109 0.101 0.117 0.054 0.050 0.058
1994 0.326 0.303 0.349 0.110 0.103 0.116 0.055 0.052 0.059
1995 0.317 0.295 0.339 0.109 0.101 0.117 0.053 0.049 0.057
1996 0.299 0.278 0.319 0.100 0.091 0.109 0.049 0.045 0.053
1997 0.331 0.306 0.356 0.109 0.101 0.116 0.050 0.047 0.053
1998 0.335 0.311 0.359 0.110 0.102 0.117 0.051 0.047 0.054
1999 0.308 0.292 0.324 0.102 0.096 0.107 0.050 0.047 0.052
2000 0.313 0.295 0.331 0.102 0.096 0.107 0.048 0.046 0.050
2001 0.292 0.274 0.309 0.103 0.097 0.108 0.049 0.047 0.052
2002 0.322 0.301 0.344 0.112 0.105 0.118 0.049 0.046 0.052
2003 0.284 0.266 0.302 0.102 0.096 0.108 0.047 0.044 0.050
2004 0.288 0.267 0.309 0.100 0.093 0.107 0.047 0.044 0.051
2005 0.278 0.258 0.298 0.103 0.096 0.110 0.049 0.046 0.053
2006 0.236 0.218 0.255 0.090 0.083 0.097 0.047 0.044 0.050
2007 0.250 0.228 0.271 0.097 0.090 0.105 0.049 0.045 0.053
2008 0.274 0.248 0.299 0.102 0.092 0.111 0.049 0.045 0.054
2009 0.236 0.213 0.259 0.093 0.085 0.101 0.050 0.046 0.054
2010 0.222 0.204 0.240 0.090 0.083 0.096 0.048 0.045 0.051
2011 0.222 0.205 0.238 0.093 0.086 0.100 0.051 0.047 0.054
2012 0.226 0.204 0.247 0.088 0.080 0.095 0.044 0.041 0.047
α = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.284 0.260 0.308 0.105 0.097 0.112 0.053 0.050 0.055
1992 0.271 0.248 0.294 0.100 0.094 0.106 0.052 0.049 0.056
1993 0.279 0.254 0.304 0.106 0.097 0.116 0.055 0.051 0.059
1994 0.275 0.251 0.299 0.107 0.100 0.114 0.057 0.052 0.061
1995 0.270 0.245 0.295 0.107 0.097 0.117 0.054 0.049 0.058
1996 0.252 0.230 0.274 0.100 0.089 0.110 0.051 0.046 0.055
1997 0.287 0.259 0.316 0.110 0.100 0.121 0.052 0.049 0.055
1998 0.287 0.258 0.317 0.109 0.099 0.119 0.051 0.047 0.055
1999 0.261 0.244 0.278 0.101 0.095 0.107 0.050 0.048 0.052
2000 0.260 0.242 0.279 0.099 0.093 0.105 0.048 0.046 0.051
2001 0.242 0.226 0.258 0.101 0.096 0.107 0.050 0.048 0.053
2002 0.271 0.250 0.292 0.110 0.103 0.117 0.050 0.047 0.053
2003 0.235 0.218 0.252 0.100 0.094 0.106 0.048 0.045 0.051
2004 0.238 0.219 0.257 0.098 0.090 0.105 0.048 0.044 0.051
2005 0.235 0.214 0.256 0.102 0.094 0.111 0.050 0.046 0.053
2006 0.199 0.181 0.217 0.089 0.082 0.097 0.048 0.045 0.051
2007 0.213 0.192 0.234 0.096 0.088 0.105 0.049 0.046 0.053
2008 0.228 0.203 0.252 0.099 0.090 0.109 0.049 0.045 0.053
2009 0.192 0.172 0.212 0.089 0.081 0.097 0.050 0.046 0.054
2010 0.181 0.166 0.196 0.087 0.080 0.093 0.048 0.045 0.051
2011 0.185 0.170 0.200 0.092 0.084 0.099 0.051 0.047 0.054
2012 0.187 0.167 0.206 0.086 0.078 0.095 0.045 0.042 0.048
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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, and wnp−time = 112)
α = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.585 0.354 0.394 0.085 0.076 0.093 0.050 0.047 0.054
1992 0.573 0.348 0.388 0.085 0.078 0.092 0.052 0.047 0.057
1993 0.574 0.351 0.394 0.087 0.079 0.095 0.053 0.048 0.058
1994 0.556 0.344 0.385 0.099 0.089 0.108 0.057 0.052 0.063
1995 0.547 0.340 0.382 0.095 0.085 0.105 0.054 0.049 0.059
1996 0.521 0.322 0.362 0.084 0.075 0.094 0.050 0.045 0.055
1997 0.562 0.347 0.392 0.090 0.081 0.099 0.053 0.048 0.058
1998 0.576 0.355 0.397 0.089 0.081 0.097 0.052 0.047 0.057
1999 0.533 0.336 0.368 0.087 0.082 0.091 0.053 0.050 0.056
2000 0.548 0.345 0.379 0.088 0.081 0.095 0.052 0.049 0.056
2001 0.517 0.332 0.365 0.092 0.087 0.097 0.055 0.052 0.058
2002 0.567 0.364 0.403 0.102 0.095 0.109 0.055 0.052 0.059
2003 0.506 0.328 0.365 0.095 0.087 0.103 0.052 0.049 0.056
2004 0.513 0.327 0.369 0.092 0.085 0.099 0.052 0.049 0.056
2005 0.490 0.320 0.362 0.100 0.092 0.108 0.057 0.053 0.062
2006 0.422 0.279 0.321 0.090 0.083 0.097 0.053 0.049 0.057
2007 0.443 0.291 0.338 0.098 0.089 0.106 0.057 0.052 0.062
2008 0.492 0.312 0.367 0.094 0.085 0.103 0.054 0.050 0.059
2009 0.429 0.278 0.328 0.091 0.082 0.100 0.056 0.050 0.061
2010 0.404 0.268 0.310 0.092 0.085 0.099 0.054 0.050 0.058
2011 0.397 0.269 0.308 0.097 0.088 0.105 0.058 0.053 0.063
2012 0.406 0.266 0.313 0.087 0.080 0.094 0.050 0.046 0.054
α = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.272 0.255 0.289 0.079 0.072 0.086 0.049 0.046 0.052
1992 0.266 0.249 0.283 0.081 0.074 0.087 0.052 0.046 0.057
1993 0.271 0.252 0.290 0.084 0.076 0.093 0.053 0.048 0.059
1994 0.268 0.251 0.285 0.093 0.085 0.102 0.057 0.051 0.064
1995 0.266 0.246 0.287 0.091 0.080 0.102 0.054 0.049 0.059
1996 0.251 0.232 0.269 0.083 0.071 0.095 0.050 0.045 0.056
1997 0.278 0.255 0.302 0.093 0.081 0.106 0.055 0.049 0.062
1998 0.276 0.256 0.296 0.089 0.079 0.099 0.053 0.047 0.058
1999 0.256 0.243 0.270 0.084 0.079 0.090 0.052 0.050 0.055
2000 0.261 0.247 0.276 0.084 0.078 0.090 0.052 0.048 0.055
2001 0.251 0.238 0.264 0.092 0.086 0.097 0.056 0.053 0.059
2002 0.277 0.261 0.293 0.098 0.092 0.104 0.055 0.052 0.059
2003 0.248 0.234 0.262 0.091 0.085 0.098 0.053 0.049 0.056
2004 0.249 0.233 0.266 0.089 0.082 0.096 0.052 0.048 0.056
2005 0.249 0.232 0.267 0.100 0.091 0.109 0.058 0.053 0.063
2006 0.218 0.201 0.234 0.091 0.083 0.099 0.054 0.050 0.058
2007 0.229 0.210 0.248 0.097 0.088 0.106 0.057 0.052 0.062
2008 0.242 0.221 0.262 0.092 0.083 0.101 0.054 0.049 0.058
2009 0.214 0.196 0.232 0.088 0.079 0.097 0.054 0.049 0.059
2010 0.204 0.189 0.220 0.089 0.082 0.097 0.053 0.049 0.057
2011 0.209 0.194 0.224 0.097 0.087 0.106 0.058 0.053 0.063
2012 0.207 0.190 0.225 0.087 0.079 0.096 0.051 0.046 0.055
α = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.252 0.232 0.272 0.082 0.074 0.090 0.051 0.047 0.054
1992 0.243 0.224 0.263 0.085 0.077 0.094 0.055 0.047 0.063
1993 0.253 0.229 0.278 0.091 0.079 0.102 0.057 0.049 0.065
1994 0.253 0.231 0.274 0.100 0.088 0.112 0.062 0.052 0.072
1995 0.259 0.224 0.293 0.099 0.081 0.116 0.057 0.050 0.064
1996 0.244 0.212 0.276 0.092 0.073 0.112 0.054 0.046 0.062
1997 0.280 0.240 0.320 0.111 0.088 0.134 0.062 0.052 0.072
1998 0.266 0.233 0.299 0.099 0.083 0.115 0.056 0.049 0.064
1999 0.242 0.225 0.259 0.091 0.084 0.098 0.055 0.052 0.058
2000 0.244 0.226 0.262 0.089 0.082 0.097 0.054 0.050 0.057
2001 0.240 0.224 0.255 0.106 0.097 0.114 0.062 0.058 0.067
2002 0.265 0.246 0.284 0.107 0.099 0.114 0.059 0.055 0.063
2003 0.233 0.217 0.249 0.100 0.093 0.107 0.056 0.053 0.060
2004 0.234 0.215 0.252 0.097 0.087 0.106 0.055 0.050 0.059
2005 0.244 0.220 0.268 0.114 0.099 0.128 0.063 0.056 0.070
2006 0.213 0.193 0.233 0.104 0.093 0.115 0.059 0.054 0.064
2007 0.225 0.201 0.250 0.109 0.096 0.123 0.061 0.055 0.068
2008 0.229 0.206 0.251 0.099 0.088 0.110 0.056 0.050 0.061
2009 0.199 0.179 0.219 0.094 0.082 0.106 0.056 0.050 0.062
2010 0.191 0.174 0.208 0.097 0.086 0.107 0.056 0.051 0.061
2011 0.204 0.184 0.223 0.109 0.095 0.123 0.062 0.055 0.069
2012 0.197 0.176 0.218 0.097 0.085 0.109 0.055 0.049 0.060
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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, and wnp−time = 130)
α = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.202 0.190 0.214 0.082 0.073 0.091 0.058 0.053 0.062
1992 0.200 0.190 0.211 0.086 0.076 0.095 0.062 0.054 0.069
1993 0.206 0.192 0.219 0.086 0.076 0.095 0.062 0.055 0.069
1994 0.210 0.197 0.224 0.105 0.092 0.118 0.071 0.062 0.080
1995 0.209 0.193 0.225 0.097 0.085 0.109 0.067 0.059 0.074
1996 0.195 0.179 0.210 0.087 0.076 0.098 0.061 0.054 0.069
1997 0.212 0.195 0.229 0.094 0.081 0.106 0.068 0.059 0.077
1998 0.212 0.197 0.226 0.091 0.080 0.101 0.065 0.057 0.072
1999 0.201 0.192 0.211 0.089 0.084 0.095 0.066 0.062 0.070
2000 0.207 0.196 0.218 0.092 0.084 0.101 0.067 0.061 0.072
2001 0.208 0.199 0.217 0.098 0.092 0.104 0.071 0.067 0.076
2002 0.230 0.219 0.241 0.106 0.099 0.114 0.074 0.069 0.079
2003 0.211 0.200 0.223 0.101 0.092 0.110 0.070 0.064 0.075
2004 0.209 0.197 0.221 0.098 0.091 0.106 0.068 0.063 0.074
2005 0.215 0.201 0.228 0.110 0.100 0.120 0.077 0.070 0.084
2006 0.195 0.182 0.208 0.101 0.093 0.109 0.071 0.066 0.077
2007 0.204 0.190 0.219 0.107 0.098 0.117 0.076 0.069 0.083
2008 0.209 0.193 0.225 0.098 0.089 0.107 0.069 0.063 0.075
2009 0.194 0.180 0.209 0.098 0.088 0.107 0.070 0.063 0.078
2010 0.191 0.178 0.204 0.101 0.092 0.110 0.070 0.065 0.076
2011 0.195 0.181 0.208 0.106 0.096 0.117 0.076 0.068 0.083
2012 0.190 0.176 0.203 0.098 0.089 0.106 0.068 0.062 0.075
α = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.181 0.170 0.192 0.079 0.071 0.087 0.058 0.053 0.063
1992 0.179 0.168 0.190 0.086 0.074 0.098 0.065 0.054 0.075
1993 0.185 0.171 0.199 0.086 0.075 0.097 0.065 0.055 0.074
1994 0.189 0.177 0.201 0.102 0.088 0.117 0.074 0.061 0.087
1995 0.192 0.172 0.211 0.095 0.082 0.109 0.068 0.059 0.077
1996 0.180 0.160 0.199 0.088 0.074 0.103 0.064 0.054 0.075
1997 0.204 0.181 0.228 0.103 0.084 0.122 0.075 0.061 0.089
1998 0.195 0.178 0.212 0.094 0.081 0.107 0.068 0.058 0.078
1999 0.183 0.173 0.194 0.090 0.084 0.096 0.067 0.063 0.072
2000 0.186 0.175 0.198 0.091 0.083 0.099 0.068 0.062 0.073
2001 0.191 0.182 0.200 0.103 0.095 0.110 0.077 0.071 0.082
2002 0.207 0.196 0.218 0.105 0.098 0.112 0.075 0.070 0.080
2003 0.190 0.180 0.199 0.100 0.092 0.107 0.072 0.067 0.076
2004 0.188 0.176 0.201 0.098 0.089 0.107 0.070 0.064 0.076
2005 0.200 0.183 0.216 0.114 0.101 0.126 0.082 0.073 0.090
2006 0.180 0.166 0.194 0.106 0.096 0.116 0.076 0.069 0.083
2007 0.188 0.172 0.205 0.112 0.100 0.123 0.080 0.071 0.089
2008 0.187 0.172 0.202 0.099 0.089 0.108 0.070 0.064 0.077
2009 0.173 0.159 0.188 0.097 0.086 0.108 0.071 0.063 0.079
2010 0.170 0.157 0.184 0.102 0.091 0.112 0.072 0.065 0.080
2011 0.179 0.164 0.194 0.111 0.098 0.124 0.080 0.071 0.089
2012 0.172 0.157 0.187 0.101 0.090 0.112 0.072 0.064 0.080
α = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.188 0.173 0.203 0.085 0.075 0.094 0.062 0.056 0.069
1992 0.187 0.171 0.202 0.101 0.080 0.122 0.077 0.057 0.097
1993 0.197 0.175 0.218 0.100 0.079 0.120 0.075 0.057 0.093
1994 0.203 0.184 0.222 0.121 0.092 0.150 0.089 0.063 0.115
1995 0.214 0.173 0.255 0.109 0.084 0.134 0.076 0.061 0.092
1996 0.203 0.162 0.244 0.105 0.077 0.132 0.074 0.057 0.092
1997 0.246 0.194 0.298 0.135 0.096 0.175 0.095 0.068 0.122
1998 0.216 0.183 0.249 0.111 0.088 0.134 0.079 0.064 0.095
1999 0.197 0.182 0.213 0.101 0.092 0.110 0.074 0.068 0.080
2000 0.200 0.183 0.217 0.101 0.090 0.112 0.075 0.067 0.082
2001 0.217 0.201 0.234 0.131 0.115 0.146 0.096 0.084 0.107
2002 0.228 0.213 0.243 0.120 0.111 0.129 0.085 0.079 0.091
2003 0.206 0.193 0.219 0.115 0.106 0.124 0.082 0.076 0.088
2004 0.204 0.185 0.222 0.112 0.098 0.125 0.079 0.070 0.088
2005 0.231 0.201 0.261 0.140 0.117 0.163 0.098 0.083 0.114
2006 0.206 0.184 0.229 0.130 0.113 0.147 0.091 0.080 0.102
2007 0.215 0.186 0.244 0.134 0.114 0.154 0.094 0.081 0.107
2008 0.202 0.182 0.222 0.112 0.099 0.124 0.078 0.069 0.086
2009 0.186 0.164 0.207 0.110 0.094 0.126 0.078 0.067 0.088
2010 0.184 0.163 0.204 0.117 0.101 0.133 0.081 0.071 0.092
2011 0.205 0.179 0.230 0.135 0.114 0.156 0.094 0.080 0.109
2012 0.190 0.166 0.213 0.119 0.102 0.136 0.083 0.071 0.094
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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, and wnp−time = 0)
α = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.166 0.147 0.184 0.096 0.087 0.105 0.082 0.077 0.088
1992 0.197 0.171 0.223 0.109 0.098 0.120 0.086 0.080 0.093
1993 0.179 0.153 0.204 0.105 0.093 0.117 0.086 0.080 0.093
1994 0.177 0.156 0.199 0.102 0.092 0.111 0.085 0.079 0.090
1995 0.155 0.133 0.177 0.096 0.086 0.106 0.084 0.077 0.090
1996 0.154 0.135 0.173 0.090 0.081 0.098 0.076 0.070 0.082
1997 0.202 0.178 0.225 0.108 0.098 0.117 0.079 0.074 0.084
1998 0.201 0.176 0.226 0.108 0.096 0.119 0.081 0.074 0.089
1999 0.191 0.175 0.206 0.107 0.100 0.115 0.084 0.079 0.088
2000 0.197 0.179 0.216 0.105 0.099 0.112 0.081 0.077 0.085
2001 0.163 0.149 0.178 0.095 0.089 0.102 0.078 0.073 0.082
2002 0.188 0.168 0.207 0.106 0.097 0.115 0.080 0.074 0.086
2003 0.165 0.143 0.186 0.097 0.087 0.107 0.078 0.072 0.085
2004 0.182 0.156 0.208 0.102 0.091 0.114 0.080 0.074 0.087
2005 0.177 0.152 0.203 0.102 0.091 0.113 0.082 0.076 0.089
2006 0.165 0.143 0.186 0.095 0.085 0.104 0.081 0.075 0.087
2007 0.188 0.162 0.215 0.105 0.094 0.116 0.082 0.075 0.089
2008 0.200 0.171 0.230 0.110 0.098 0.123 0.084 0.078 0.090
2009 0.178 0.144 0.211 0.101 0.086 0.115 0.085 0.077 0.092
2010 0.171 0.153 0.190 0.098 0.090 0.107 0.082 0.077 0.088
2011 0.176 0.151 0.200 0.102 0.092 0.112 0.089 0.083 0.096
2012 0.199 0.168 0.230 0.103 0.090 0.117 0.081 0.072 0.090
α = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.105 0.096 0.113 0.078 0.072 0.084 0.078 0.074 0.082
1992 0.116 0.105 0.127 0.087 0.080 0.094 0.081 0.076 0.085
1993 0.113 0.102 0.125 0.086 0.078 0.094 0.082 0.076 0.087
1994 0.115 0.104 0.125 0.082 0.076 0.089 0.079 0.075 0.083
1995 0.104 0.094 0.115 0.080 0.073 0.087 0.078 0.073 0.083
1996 0.103 0.093 0.112 0.076 0.070 0.082 0.072 0.067 0.076
1997 0.125 0.115 0.135 0.089 0.082 0.096 0.074 0.070 0.078
1998 0.126 0.113 0.139 0.088 0.081 0.096 0.075 0.070 0.081
1999 0.124 0.116 0.131 0.089 0.084 0.094 0.077 0.074 0.081
2000 0.121 0.113 0.129 0.086 0.082 0.091 0.074 0.071 0.078
2001 0.107 0.101 0.113 0.080 0.076 0.084 0.073 0.070 0.076
2002 0.117 0.109 0.125 0.086 0.081 0.091 0.074 0.070 0.077
2003 0.105 0.097 0.113 0.079 0.073 0.084 0.072 0.068 0.076
2004 0.114 0.103 0.124 0.084 0.077 0.091 0.075 0.070 0.080
2005 0.115 0.103 0.126 0.086 0.078 0.093 0.077 0.072 0.082
2006 0.106 0.097 0.115 0.080 0.074 0.086 0.076 0.071 0.080
2007 0.122 0.109 0.135 0.088 0.080 0.096 0.076 0.071 0.082
2008 0.119 0.107 0.131 0.089 0.081 0.098 0.078 0.073 0.082
2009 0.110 0.096 0.124 0.083 0.073 0.093 0.078 0.072 0.084
2010 0.108 0.100 0.116 0.082 0.076 0.088 0.076 0.072 0.080
2011 0.111 0.101 0.121 0.085 0.078 0.091 0.081 0.076 0.086
2012 0.120 0.107 0.133 0.084 0.076 0.092 0.072 0.067 0.078
α = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.095 0.086 0.104 0.076 0.070 0.081 0.080 0.076 0.084
1992 0.102 0.093 0.111 0.083 0.077 0.090 0.083 0.079 0.088
1993 0.105 0.093 0.116 0.084 0.076 0.092 0.085 0.079 0.090
1994 0.106 0.096 0.116 0.079 0.073 0.085 0.080 0.076 0.085
1995 0.098 0.088 0.108 0.079 0.072 0.085 0.080 0.075 0.085
1996 0.097 0.088 0.106 0.075 0.069 0.082 0.074 0.069 0.078
1997 0.114 0.105 0.124 0.086 0.079 0.093 0.076 0.071 0.080
1998 0.118 0.102 0.135 0.085 0.077 0.094 0.076 0.071 0.081
1999 0.115 0.108 0.122 0.088 0.083 0.093 0.079 0.075 0.082
2000 0.109 0.102 0.116 0.083 0.078 0.087 0.075 0.072 0.078
2001 0.099 0.093 0.104 0.077 0.073 0.081 0.074 0.071 0.077
2002 0.106 0.099 0.113 0.082 0.078 0.087 0.074 0.071 0.078
2003 0.096 0.089 0.103 0.075 0.070 0.080 0.072 0.068 0.076
2004 0.103 0.094 0.112 0.081 0.075 0.087 0.076 0.071 0.080
2005 0.108 0.096 0.119 0.084 0.077 0.091 0.078 0.073 0.082
2006 0.099 0.090 0.107 0.078 0.072 0.083 0.076 0.072 0.080
2007 0.116 0.103 0.128 0.086 0.078 0.094 0.076 0.071 0.082
2008 0.107 0.096 0.117 0.085 0.077 0.093 0.078 0.073 0.082
2009 0.099 0.087 0.112 0.079 0.069 0.089 0.077 0.071 0.083
2010 0.099 0.092 0.106 0.080 0.074 0.086 0.075 0.071 0.080
2011 0.103 0.094 0.113 0.082 0.076 0.089 0.080 0.075 0.084
2012 0.108 0.098 0.118 0.081 0.074 0.088 0.071 0.066 0.076
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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, and wnp−time = 14)
φ = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.419 0.395 0.442 0.342 0.318 0.366 0.074 0.062 0.086
1992 0.408 0.383 0.434 0.329 0.305 0.353 0.064 0.054 0.074
1993 0.417 0.394 0.440 0.331 0.309 0.353 0.065 0.053 0.077
1994 0.405 0.381 0.429 0.322 0.299 0.346 0.051 0.042 0.061
1995 0.393 0.371 0.415 0.310 0.288 0.332 0.061 0.049 0.072
1996 0.382 0.356 0.408 0.301 0.279 0.323 0.046 0.035 0.056
1997 0.414 0.387 0.441 0.326 0.301 0.351 0.045 0.037 0.054
1998 0.411 0.386 0.436 0.327 0.304 0.350 0.055 0.042 0.068
1999 0.417 0.399 0.435 0.302 0.287 0.318 0.055 0.047 0.063
2000 0.402 0.384 0.421 0.313 0.296 0.330 0.057 0.049 0.066
2001 0.383 0.363 0.403 0.288 0.269 0.307 0.056 0.046 0.067
2002 0.398 0.376 0.420 0.318 0.297 0.340 0.057 0.046 0.068
2003 0.372 0.349 0.395 0.279 0.259 0.299 0.049 0.040 0.059
2004 0.379 0.354 0.404 0.281 0.258 0.304 0.056 0.045 0.068
2005 0.360 0.338 0.382 0.258 0.238 0.278 0.050 0.040 0.060
2006 0.309 0.287 0.331 0.226 0.207 0.245 0.044 0.034 0.054
2007 0.332 0.308 0.357 0.236 0.214 0.258 0.048 0.035 0.062
2008 0.342 0.313 0.371 0.262 0.235 0.289 0.047 0.034 0.061
2009 0.317 0.288 0.347 0.221 0.196 0.246 0.043 0.030 0.056
2010 0.289 0.268 0.310 0.206 0.187 0.225 0.030 0.021 0.039
2011 0.288 0.267 0.309 0.199 0.180 0.219 0.044 0.033 0.055
2012 0.294 0.269 0.320 0.207 0.183 0.230 0.026 0.018 0.034
φ = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.333 0.311 0.354 0.179 0.165 0.192 0.015 0.012 0.018
1992 0.325 0.303 0.347 0.170 0.157 0.183 0.014 0.011 0.018
1993 0.322 0.302 0.342 0.171 0.158 0.185 0.015 0.011 0.019
1994 0.312 0.291 0.334 0.163 0.151 0.176 0.012 0.009 0.015
1995 0.297 0.278 0.317 0.158 0.146 0.170 0.012 0.009 0.015
1996 0.287 0.266 0.307 0.148 0.136 0.161 0.010 0.007 0.012
1997 0.314 0.292 0.337 0.161 0.149 0.173 0.009 0.007 0.011
1998 0.320 0.299 0.341 0.165 0.152 0.177 0.011 0.008 0.015
1999 0.297 0.282 0.312 0.150 0.141 0.159 0.012 0.009 0.014
2000 0.300 0.284 0.315 0.153 0.144 0.162 0.011 0.009 0.013
2001 0.277 0.259 0.295 0.145 0.134 0.156 0.011 0.009 0.014
2002 0.301 0.281 0.321 0.158 0.146 0.170 0.009 0.007 0.011
2003 0.267 0.248 0.285 0.140 0.129 0.150 0.010 0.007 0.012
2004 0.271 0.251 0.291 0.140 0.127 0.152 0.010 0.007 0.013
2005 0.253 0.234 0.271 0.129 0.118 0.141 0.011 0.008 0.014
2006 0.213 0.196 0.229 0.107 0.097 0.116 0.008 0.005 0.011
2007 0.224 0.203 0.244 0.114 0.102 0.126 0.010 0.006 0.013
2008 0.249 0.224 0.274 0.129 0.114 0.144 0.010 0.006 0.014
2009 0.218 0.194 0.241 0.111 0.097 0.125 0.009 0.005 0.013
2010 0.199 0.181 0.217 0.098 0.088 0.108 0.006 0.004 0.008
2011 0.195 0.178 0.212 0.100 0.089 0.111 0.010 0.007 0.013
2012 0.204 0.182 0.226 0.099 0.086 0.112 0.004 0.002 0.006
φ = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.302 0.281 0.323 0.103 0.094 0.111 0.006 0.004 0.007
1992 0.294 0.273 0.315 0.097 0.089 0.105 0.006 0.004 0.008
1993 0.291 0.272 0.311 0.098 0.090 0.107 0.006 0.004 0.009
1994 0.281 0.260 0.301 0.092 0.084 0.099 0.005 0.003 0.007
1995 0.268 0.249 0.287 0.089 0.082 0.097 0.004 0.003 0.006
1996 0.258 0.238 0.277 0.083 0.075 0.091 0.003 0.002 0.005
1997 0.283 0.261 0.304 0.088 0.081 0.095 0.003 0.002 0.004
1998 0.288 0.268 0.308 0.092 0.084 0.100 0.004 0.002 0.005
1999 0.263 0.249 0.277 0.083 0.077 0.089 0.004 0.003 0.005
2000 0.268 0.253 0.283 0.085 0.079 0.091 0.004 0.003 0.005
2001 0.248 0.231 0.265 0.082 0.075 0.089 0.004 0.002 0.005
2002 0.270 0.252 0.289 0.090 0.082 0.097 0.003 0.002 0.003
2003 0.238 0.220 0.255 0.079 0.072 0.086 0.003 0.002 0.004
2004 0.242 0.223 0.261 0.078 0.070 0.086 0.003 0.002 0.005
2005 0.224 0.206 0.242 0.073 0.066 0.080 0.004 0.002 0.005
2006 0.188 0.172 0.204 0.059 0.052 0.066 0.003 0.001 0.004
2007 0.196 0.177 0.216 0.065 0.057 0.073 0.004 0.002 0.006
2008 0.223 0.199 0.247 0.073 0.063 0.083 0.003 0.002 0.005
2009 0.192 0.170 0.214 0.063 0.054 0.072 0.003 0.001 0.005
2010 0.176 0.159 0.193 0.054 0.047 0.060 0.002 0.001 0.003
2011 0.172 0.156 0.188 0.058 0.051 0.065 0.004 0.002 0.005
2012 0.179 0.158 0.199 0.055 0.047 0.063 0.001 0.001 0.002
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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, and wnp−time = 16)
φ = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.391 0.368 0.413 0.317 0.293 0.340 0.061 0.050 0.072
1992 0.382 0.358 0.407 0.303 0.279 0.326 0.054 0.046 0.062
1993 0.393 0.371 0.415 0.306 0.282 0.329 0.055 0.046 0.064
1994 0.388 0.366 0.411 0.297 0.276 0.318 0.045 0.036 0.054
1995 0.367 0.346 0.389 0.296 0.275 0.318 0.054 0.043 0.066
1996 0.357 0.333 0.381 0.282 0.258 0.306 0.039 0.029 0.049
1997 0.383 0.359 0.407 0.294 0.270 0.318 0.038 0.030 0.046
1998 0.388 0.365 0.411 0.300 0.278 0.322 0.049 0.037 0.060
1999 0.373 0.355 0.390 0.279 0.263 0.294 0.048 0.041 0.055
2000 0.380 0.362 0.399 0.281 0.264 0.298 0.051 0.043 0.059
2001 0.362 0.342 0.381 0.264 0.245 0.283 0.048 0.038 0.057
2002 0.384 0.360 0.407 0.304 0.281 0.327 0.052 0.042 0.062
2003 0.355 0.333 0.376 0.270 0.250 0.290 0.046 0.037 0.056
2004 0.359 0.336 0.383 0.264 0.242 0.286 0.048 0.038 0.058
2005 0.348 0.327 0.368 0.257 0.237 0.277 0.047 0.038 0.056
2006 0.295 0.273 0.318 0.208 0.188 0.227 0.035 0.025 0.045
2007 0.314 0.287 0.341 0.218 0.196 0.240 0.043 0.030 0.055
2008 0.320 0.293 0.347 0.242 0.216 0.267 0.043 0.029 0.056
2009 0.309 0.279 0.339 0.211 0.187 0.234 0.040 0.027 0.053
2010 0.280 0.258 0.301 0.185 0.167 0.204 0.029 0.020 0.038
2011 0.278 0.256 0.300 0.186 0.167 0.205 0.037 0.028 0.046
2012 0.288 0.260 0.315 0.191 0.167 0.214 0.021 0.014 0.028
φ = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.307 0.286 0.327 0.104 0.095 0.114 0.011 0.008 0.014
1992 0.299 0.278 0.320 0.099 0.091 0.107 0.011 0.008 0.014
1993 0.296 0.277 0.316 0.100 0.091 0.109 0.011 0.008 0.015
1994 0.289 0.269 0.309 0.098 0.090 0.106 0.010 0.007 0.013
1995 0.277 0.258 0.295 0.094 0.085 0.102 0.010 0.007 0.012
1996 0.264 0.245 0.283 0.085 0.076 0.094 0.007 0.005 0.010
1997 0.287 0.266 0.309 0.090 0.083 0.097 0.007 0.005 0.008
1998 0.293 0.273 0.313 0.096 0.087 0.105 0.009 0.006 0.011
1999 0.271 0.257 0.285 0.086 0.080 0.093 0.009 0.007 0.011
2000 0.278 0.263 0.293 0.089 0.082 0.096 0.009 0.007 0.011
2001 0.255 0.239 0.272 0.086 0.078 0.094 0.009 0.007 0.011
2002 0.281 0.262 0.300 0.098 0.089 0.106 0.008 0.006 0.010
2003 0.250 0.233 0.268 0.085 0.077 0.092 0.008 0.006 0.010
2004 0.253 0.234 0.271 0.084 0.075 0.093 0.009 0.006 0.011
2005 0.238 0.221 0.256 0.079 0.072 0.087 0.009 0.006 0.012
2006 0.197 0.181 0.213 0.063 0.056 0.071 0.007 0.004 0.009
2007 0.205 0.185 0.225 0.069 0.062 0.077 0.008 0.005 0.011
2008 0.230 0.206 0.254 0.077 0.067 0.088 0.008 0.005 0.011
2009 0.201 0.179 0.223 0.068 0.059 0.077 0.008 0.005 0.012
2010 0.184 0.168 0.201 0.060 0.052 0.067 0.005 0.004 0.007
2011 0.180 0.164 0.197 0.063 0.055 0.070 0.008 0.005 0.011
2012 0.187 0.166 0.207 0.058 0.050 0.067 0.003 0.002 0.005
φ = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.268 0.249 0.287 0.045 0.039 0.050 0.004 0.002 0.005
1992 0.261 0.242 0.280 0.042 0.038 0.047 0.004 0.002 0.006
1993 0.259 0.241 0.276 0.043 0.038 0.048 0.004 0.003 0.006
1994 0.250 0.231 0.268 0.042 0.037 0.046 0.004 0.002 0.005
1995 0.240 0.223 0.257 0.040 0.035 0.045 0.003 0.002 0.004
1996 0.229 0.211 0.246 0.035 0.030 0.039 0.002 0.001 0.004
1997 0.249 0.230 0.269 0.035 0.032 0.038 0.002 0.001 0.003
1998 0.256 0.237 0.274 0.040 0.035 0.044 0.003 0.002 0.004
1999 0.233 0.221 0.246 0.036 0.032 0.039 0.003 0.002 0.004
2000 0.241 0.227 0.254 0.037 0.033 0.041 0.003 0.002 0.004
2001 0.221 0.206 0.236 0.036 0.032 0.040 0.003 0.002 0.004
2002 0.243 0.226 0.260 0.042 0.037 0.047 0.002 0.002 0.003
2003 0.214 0.199 0.230 0.036 0.032 0.040 0.002 0.001 0.003
2004 0.217 0.200 0.234 0.036 0.031 0.041 0.003 0.002 0.004
2005 0.202 0.186 0.219 0.034 0.029 0.038 0.003 0.001 0.004
2006 0.168 0.154 0.183 0.027 0.022 0.031 0.002 0.001 0.003
2007 0.175 0.157 0.193 0.031 0.026 0.035 0.003 0.002 0.004
2008 0.199 0.177 0.221 0.033 0.027 0.039 0.002 0.001 0.004
2009 0.172 0.152 0.192 0.029 0.024 0.035 0.003 0.001 0.004
2010 0.157 0.142 0.173 0.025 0.022 0.029 0.002 0.001 0.002
2011 0.154 0.139 0.169 0.028 0.024 0.033 0.003 0.002 0.004
2012 0.159 0.140 0.178 0.024 0.020 0.028 0.001 0.000 0.001
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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, and wnp−time = 112)
φ = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.391 0.347 0.393 0.163 0.145 0.180 0.047 0.036 0.059
1992 0.382 0.336 0.385 0.164 0.146 0.183 0.039 0.032 0.046
1993 0.393 0.346 0.391 0.178 0.158 0.198 0.045 0.037 0.054
1994 0.388 0.357 0.400 0.177 0.161 0.193 0.048 0.038 0.058
1995 0.367 0.344 0.387 0.179 0.159 0.199 0.046 0.037 0.055
1996 0.357 0.314 0.363 0.162 0.143 0.181 0.032 0.025 0.039
1997 0.383 0.339 0.386 0.159 0.143 0.175 0.025 0.019 0.032
1998 0.388 0.344 0.390 0.177 0.157 0.197 0.037 0.027 0.047
1999 0.373 0.334 0.368 0.170 0.156 0.183 0.043 0.036 0.049
2000 0.380 0.346 0.382 0.171 0.155 0.187 0.048 0.039 0.057
2001 0.362 0.320 0.358 0.171 0.154 0.188 0.041 0.032 0.050
2002 0.384 0.347 0.392 0.190 0.171 0.208 0.050 0.040 0.059
2003 0.355 0.320 0.362 0.192 0.173 0.211 0.041 0.032 0.050
2004 0.359 0.337 0.380 0.183 0.163 0.203 0.046 0.035 0.056
2005 0.348 0.318 0.360 0.194 0.176 0.212 0.052 0.042 0.061
2006 0.295 0.272 0.316 0.143 0.126 0.161 0.040 0.029 0.050
2007 0.314 0.274 0.326 0.168 0.150 0.186 0.044 0.032 0.056
2008 0.320 0.287 0.339 0.161 0.141 0.182 0.042 0.029 0.054
2009 0.309 0.265 0.319 0.158 0.138 0.177 0.048 0.034 0.061
2010 0.280 0.258 0.302 0.146 0.129 0.164 0.033 0.025 0.040
2011 0.278 0.248 0.290 0.156 0.139 0.174 0.041 0.031 0.051
2012 0.288 0.263 0.316 0.145 0.125 0.165 0.026 0.018 0.033
φ = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.261 0.243 0.279 0.040 0.033 0.046 0.008 0.005 0.010
1992 0.255 0.237 0.273 0.039 0.033 0.045 0.008 0.005 0.010
1993 0.254 0.237 0.271 0.039 0.034 0.044 0.008 0.006 0.010
1994 0.248 0.232 0.265 0.044 0.038 0.050 0.008 0.006 0.010
1995 0.239 0.223 0.255 0.042 0.036 0.048 0.007 0.005 0.009
1996 0.227 0.210 0.244 0.035 0.030 0.040 0.005 0.003 0.007
1997 0.244 0.226 0.262 0.031 0.027 0.035 0.004 0.003 0.006
1998 0.253 0.235 0.270 0.038 0.032 0.043 0.005 0.004 0.007
1999 0.233 0.220 0.245 0.036 0.033 0.040 0.007 0.006 0.009
2000 0.242 0.229 0.255 0.040 0.035 0.045 0.008 0.006 0.010
2001 0.222 0.208 0.237 0.036 0.032 0.041 0.007 0.006 0.009
2002 0.245 0.229 0.262 0.047 0.041 0.053 0.009 0.007 0.011
2003 0.220 0.205 0.235 0.043 0.037 0.049 0.007 0.005 0.009
2004 0.222 0.206 0.238 0.041 0.035 0.046 0.008 0.005 0.010
2005 0.210 0.195 0.226 0.042 0.037 0.047 0.008 0.006 0.011
2006 0.173 0.159 0.187 0.032 0.027 0.037 0.006 0.004 0.008
2007 0.180 0.163 0.198 0.035 0.030 0.040 0.007 0.004 0.010
2008 0.201 0.180 0.221 0.036 0.029 0.043 0.006 0.004 0.009
2009 0.178 0.159 0.197 0.034 0.028 0.041 0.008 0.005 0.011
2010 0.164 0.149 0.178 0.032 0.027 0.036 0.005 0.003 0.006
2011 0.160 0.146 0.174 0.034 0.029 0.039 0.006 0.004 0.008
2012 0.166 0.148 0.184 0.026 0.022 0.030 0.003 0.002 0.004
φ = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.197 0.183 0.211 0.016 0.011 0.020 0.002 0.001 0.003
1992 0.193 0.179 0.207 0.014 0.011 0.017 0.003 0.001 0.004
1993 0.192 0.178 0.205 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.003
1994 0.184 0.171 0.197 0.017 0.014 0.021 0.002 0.002 0.003
1995 0.177 0.165 0.189 0.015 0.012 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.003
1996 0.169 0.157 0.182 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.003
1997 0.183 0.169 0.196 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.001 0.001 0.002
1998 0.191 0.177 0.205 0.012 0.010 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.002
1999 0.174 0.165 0.184 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.003
2000 0.183 0.173 0.193 0.015 0.013 0.018 0.002 0.002 0.003
2001 0.167 0.156 0.179 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.003
2002 0.186 0.173 0.199 0.019 0.016 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.003
2003 0.165 0.153 0.176 0.016 0.012 0.019 0.002 0.001 0.003
2004 0.166 0.153 0.179 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.002 0.001 0.003
2005 0.155 0.143 0.167 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.002 0.001 0.003
2006 0.129 0.118 0.140 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.002
2007 0.134 0.120 0.148 0.012 0.009 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.003
2008 0.151 0.135 0.168 0.013 0.009 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.003
2009 0.132 0.117 0.148 0.012 0.009 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.003
2010 0.122 0.110 0.133 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.002
2011 0.119 0.107 0.130 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.002
2012 0.123 0.109 0.137 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.001
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
43










, and wnp−time = 130)
φ = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.368 0.344 0.391 0.098 0.083 0.112 0.048 0.036 0.060
1992 0.361 0.337 0.385 0.098 0.081 0.115 0.046 0.036 0.056
1993 0.365 0.343 0.387 0.112 0.097 0.128 0.055 0.045 0.065
1994 0.377 0.356 0.399 0.139 0.125 0.154 0.060 0.048 0.071
1995 0.362 0.341 0.383 0.131 0.113 0.148 0.065 0.053 0.078
1996 0.340 0.315 0.365 0.104 0.091 0.118 0.050 0.041 0.059
1997 0.361 0.338 0.385 0.099 0.084 0.114 0.037 0.029 0.044
1998 0.373 0.351 0.395 0.114 0.099 0.128 0.048 0.038 0.057
1999 0.347 0.331 0.364 0.121 0.111 0.132 0.059 0.051 0.067
2000 0.360 0.342 0.379 0.126 0.112 0.139 0.062 0.052 0.072
2001 0.339 0.321 0.357 0.121 0.107 0.134 0.063 0.053 0.074
2002 0.365 0.342 0.387 0.147 0.131 0.162 0.081 0.068 0.093
2003 0.344 0.323 0.365 0.142 0.125 0.160 0.076 0.062 0.089
2004 0.358 0.337 0.379 0.147 0.131 0.163 0.073 0.060 0.085
2005 0.339 0.318 0.359 0.152 0.136 0.169 0.080 0.068 0.093
2006 0.294 0.271 0.316 0.135 0.119 0.152 0.057 0.045 0.069
2007 0.301 0.275 0.327 0.137 0.120 0.154 0.054 0.042 0.066
2008 0.315 0.288 0.341 0.127 0.109 0.145 0.054 0.041 0.068
2009 0.294 0.267 0.322 0.132 0.112 0.151 0.071 0.055 0.086
2010 0.285 0.263 0.306 0.129 0.114 0.144 0.057 0.047 0.067
2011 0.277 0.257 0.297 0.135 0.119 0.150 0.062 0.052 0.073
2012 0.294 0.268 0.321 0.128 0.109 0.148 0.043 0.034 0.052
φ = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.169 0.157 0.180 0.025 0.018 0.032 0.009 0.006 0.012
1992 0.167 0.154 0.179 0.025 0.018 0.031 0.008 0.006 0.011
1993 0.167 0.156 0.178 0.025 0.021 0.028 0.008 0.006 0.010
1994 0.164 0.154 0.175 0.033 0.028 0.038 0.011 0.008 0.013
1995 0.158 0.148 0.168 0.030 0.025 0.036 0.011 0.008 0.013
1996 0.150 0.139 0.161 0.026 0.021 0.030 0.007 0.005 0.010
1997 0.158 0.147 0.169 0.020 0.016 0.023 0.005 0.004 0.007
1998 0.169 0.157 0.181 0.025 0.020 0.029 0.006 0.005 0.008
1999 0.156 0.148 0.165 0.026 0.023 0.029 0.010 0.008 0.011
2000 0.166 0.157 0.175 0.031 0.026 0.036 0.012 0.009 0.015
2001 0.152 0.143 0.162 0.027 0.024 0.031 0.011 0.009 0.012
2002 0.172 0.160 0.184 0.038 0.032 0.043 0.015 0.012 0.018
2003 0.156 0.145 0.167 0.035 0.029 0.041 0.012 0.009 0.015
2004 0.157 0.145 0.168 0.034 0.029 0.038 0.012 0.010 0.014
2005 0.149 0.139 0.160 0.035 0.031 0.040 0.012 0.010 0.015
2006 0.123 0.114 0.133 0.027 0.023 0.031 0.009 0.006 0.011
2007 0.128 0.116 0.140 0.028 0.023 0.032 0.009 0.006 0.012
2008 0.139 0.125 0.154 0.026 0.021 0.032 0.009 0.006 0.012
2009 0.127 0.114 0.140 0.029 0.024 0.034 0.012 0.009 0.015
2010 0.118 0.108 0.128 0.028 0.024 0.032 0.008 0.006 0.010
2011 0.116 0.106 0.126 0.027 0.023 0.031 0.008 0.006 0.010
2012 0.120 0.108 0.132 0.024 0.020 0.027 0.006 0.005 0.008
φ = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.084 0.077 0.091 0.011 0.007 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.004
1992 0.083 0.076 0.090 0.010 0.007 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.004
1993 0.083 0.077 0.089 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.003
1994 0.081 0.075 0.087 0.014 0.011 0.017 0.003 0.002 0.004
1995 0.077 0.071 0.083 0.012 0.009 0.016 0.003 0.002 0.004
1996 0.073 0.068 0.079 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003
1997 0.076 0.070 0.082 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.002
1998 0.085 0.078 0.092 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.002
1999 0.078 0.074 0.083 0.009 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.003
2000 0.085 0.080 0.091 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.004 0.003 0.005
2001 0.077 0.072 0.083 0.010 0.008 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.004
2002 0.091 0.084 0.097 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.005 0.003 0.006
2003 0.081 0.074 0.087 0.014 0.010 0.017 0.003 0.002 0.005
2004 0.080 0.074 0.087 0.012 0.010 0.014 0.003 0.002 0.004
2005 0.075 0.069 0.081 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.003 0.002 0.004
2006 0.062 0.057 0.068 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.003
2007 0.065 0.059 0.072 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.003 0.001 0.004
2008 0.072 0.064 0.080 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003
2009 0.065 0.057 0.072 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.003 0.002 0.004
2010 0.061 0.055 0.067 0.009 0.007 0.011 0.002 0.001 0.003
2011 0.059 0.054 0.065 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.003
2012 0.061 0.054 0.068 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.002
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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, and wnp−time = 0)
φ = 0
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.182 0.166 0.198 0.097 0.087 0.107 0.054 0.045 0.062
1992 0.181 0.162 0.200 0.114 0.099 0.128 0.054 0.045 0.064
1993 0.183 0.164 0.201 0.112 0.097 0.128 0.064 0.052 0.076
1994 0.186 0.166 0.205 0.107 0.093 0.121 0.057 0.048 0.066
1995 0.170 0.151 0.188 0.101 0.086 0.116 0.052 0.041 0.063
1996 0.182 0.162 0.202 0.108 0.093 0.123 0.049 0.039 0.059
1997 0.206 0.187 0.224 0.114 0.100 0.127 0.051 0.041 0.061
1998 0.196 0.173 0.218 0.124 0.107 0.141 0.049 0.039 0.059
1999 0.216 0.202 0.231 0.128 0.116 0.140 0.059 0.051 0.068
2000 0.205 0.191 0.220 0.137 0.125 0.150 0.058 0.050 0.067
2001 0.208 0.192 0.223 0.126 0.113 0.139 0.055 0.047 0.063
2002 0.208 0.191 0.226 0.135 0.121 0.149 0.069 0.059 0.079
2003 0.200 0.181 0.219 0.128 0.114 0.142 0.067 0.055 0.079
2004 0.208 0.187 0.230 0.131 0.112 0.149 0.066 0.054 0.078
2005 0.201 0.183 0.219 0.128 0.112 0.144 0.068 0.055 0.081
2006 0.184 0.166 0.203 0.117 0.102 0.133 0.063 0.050 0.077
2007 0.213 0.190 0.235 0.136 0.117 0.155 0.069 0.054 0.085
2008 0.192 0.172 0.212 0.124 0.106 0.143 0.067 0.053 0.081
2009 0.192 0.169 0.216 0.115 0.096 0.133 0.072 0.057 0.087
2010 0.175 0.159 0.192 0.111 0.096 0.126 0.056 0.045 0.067
2011 0.185 0.166 0.204 0.119 0.103 0.135 0.067 0.054 0.080
2012 0.196 0.176 0.216 0.107 0.089 0.124 0.049 0.038 0.060
φ = 1
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.070 0.061 0.078 0.034 0.028 0.039 0.014 0.011 0.017
1992 0.080 0.069 0.092 0.042 0.035 0.050 0.016 0.013 0.020
1993 0.073 0.063 0.083 0.039 0.032 0.046 0.017 0.013 0.021
1994 0.073 0.064 0.082 0.037 0.031 0.044 0.016 0.013 0.020
1995 0.063 0.054 0.073 0.031 0.025 0.038 0.016 0.011 0.020
1996 0.064 0.056 0.072 0.032 0.026 0.037 0.013 0.009 0.017
1997 0.082 0.072 0.092 0.043 0.036 0.050 0.013 0.010 0.016
1998 0.083 0.072 0.095 0.042 0.035 0.050 0.014 0.009 0.018
1999 0.082 0.075 0.089 0.041 0.036 0.046 0.016 0.013 0.018
2000 0.083 0.076 0.091 0.043 0.038 0.048 0.015 0.013 0.017
2001 0.071 0.065 0.078 0.035 0.031 0.039 0.014 0.011 0.017
2002 0.081 0.073 0.089 0.043 0.037 0.049 0.016 0.012 0.019
2003 0.071 0.062 0.080 0.038 0.032 0.045 0.017 0.013 0.021
2004 0.075 0.064 0.087 0.042 0.034 0.050 0.017 0.012 0.021
2005 0.072 0.062 0.082 0.038 0.031 0.046 0.016 0.012 0.020
2006 0.066 0.057 0.075 0.035 0.029 0.041 0.014 0.010 0.018
2007 0.076 0.065 0.087 0.041 0.034 0.048 0.016 0.011 0.020
2008 0.078 0.066 0.090 0.043 0.035 0.052 0.015 0.011 0.019
2009 0.072 0.059 0.086 0.038 0.028 0.048 0.017 0.012 0.022
2010 0.066 0.058 0.074 0.033 0.028 0.039 0.011 0.009 0.014
2011 0.068 0.058 0.078 0.037 0.029 0.044 0.017 0.013 0.021
2012 0.077 0.065 0.090 0.038 0.030 0.047 0.014 0.009 0.018
φ = 2
β = −1 β = 0 β = 1
Year Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval Coeff. Conf. Interval
1991 0.045 0.038 0.052 0.020 0.016 0.024 0.007 0.005 0.009
1992 0.056 0.047 0.066 0.026 0.021 0.031 0.008 0.006 0.010
1993 0.048 0.040 0.057 0.024 0.018 0.029 0.007 0.005 0.009
1994 0.048 0.040 0.055 0.022 0.018 0.027 0.008 0.005 0.010
1995 0.039 0.031 0.047 0.018 0.014 0.023 0.007 0.005 0.009
1996 0.040 0.033 0.046 0.017 0.013 0.021 0.006 0.004 0.008
1997 0.055 0.047 0.064 0.025 0.020 0.029 0.006 0.004 0.007
1998 0.055 0.046 0.064 0.024 0.019 0.029 0.006 0.003 0.009
1999 0.051 0.045 0.057 0.023 0.019 0.026 0.007 0.005 0.008
2000 0.055 0.049 0.062 0.024 0.020 0.027 0.006 0.005 0.008
2001 0.043 0.038 0.048 0.019 0.016 0.022 0.006 0.004 0.008
2002 0.052 0.045 0.059 0.024 0.019 0.028 0.007 0.004 0.009
2003 0.044 0.037 0.052 0.021 0.016 0.026 0.007 0.005 0.009
2004 0.049 0.039 0.058 0.023 0.017 0.029 0.006 0.004 0.009
2005 0.045 0.036 0.054 0.020 0.015 0.026 0.006 0.004 0.009
2006 0.042 0.035 0.050 0.019 0.014 0.023 0.005 0.003 0.008
2007 0.049 0.039 0.058 0.022 0.017 0.027 0.006 0.003 0.008
2008 0.054 0.044 0.065 0.025 0.019 0.031 0.006 0.004 0.008
2009 0.047 0.035 0.059 0.022 0.015 0.029 0.006 0.003 0.009
2010 0.043 0.036 0.050 0.018 0.015 0.022 0.004 0.003 0.005
2011 0.045 0.036 0.054 0.021 0.016 0.026 0.007 0.005 0.009
2012 0.053 0.042 0.065 0.022 0.016 0.029 0.007 0.003 0.010
Source: SOEP (v30), own calculations.
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